opa
Expert guidance for OPA (Open Policy Agent), the CNCF policy engine for unified authorization across the stack. Helps developers write Rego policies for Kubernetes admission control, API authorization, infrastructure-as-code validation, and data filtering — enforcing security policies as code.
Usage
Getting Started
- Install the skill using the command above
- Open your AI coding agent (Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, or Cursor)
- Reference the skill in your prompt
- The AI will use the skill's capabilities automatically
Example Prompts
- "Deploy the latest build to the staging environment and run smoke tests"
- "Check the CI pipeline status and summarize any recent failures"
Documentation
Overview
OPA (Open Policy Agent), the CNCF policy engine for unified authorization across the stack. Helps developers write Rego policies for Kubernetes admission control, API authorization, infrastructure-as-code validation, and data filtering — enforcing security policies as code.
Instructions
Rego Policy Language
# policy/authz.rego — API authorization policy
package authz
import rego.v1
default allow := false
# Admin users can do anything
allow if {
input.user.role == "admin"
}
# Users can read their own data
allow if {
input.method == "GET"
input.path[0] == "users"
input.path[1] == input.user.id
}
# Users can update their own profile
allow if {
input.method in {"PUT", "PATCH"}
input.path[0] == "users"
input.path[1] == input.user.id
not input.body.role # Can't change own role
}
# Team members can read team resources
allow if {
input.method == "GET"
input.path[0] == "teams"
team_id := input.path[1]
team_id in input.user.teams
}
# Managers can approve expenses under $10,000
allow if {
input.method == "POST"
input.path == ["expenses", "approve"]
input.user.role == "manager"
input.body.amount < 10000
}
# Deny reasons for audit trail
reasons contains msg if {
not allow
input.user.role != "admin"
msg := sprintf("User %s with role %s denied access to %s %s",
[input.user.id, input.user.role, input.method, concat("/", input.path)])
}
Kubernetes Admission Control (Gatekeeper)
# Gatekeeper ConstraintTemplate — define reusable policy templates
apiVersion: templates.gatekeeper.sh/v1
kind: ConstraintTemplate
metadata:
name: k8srequiredlabels
spec:
crd:
spec:
names:
kind: K8sRequiredLabels
validation:
openAPIV3Schema:
type: object
properties:
labels:
type: array
items:
type: string
targets:
- target: admission.k8s.gatekeeper.sh
rego: |
package k8srequiredlabels
import rego.v1
violation contains {"msg": msg} if {
provided := {label | input.review.object.metadata.labels[label]}
required := {label | label := input.parameters.labels[_]}
missing := required - provided
count(missing) > 0
msg := sprintf("Missing required labels: %v", [missing])
}
---
# Apply the constraint — all deployments must have these labels
apiVersion: constraints.gatekeeper.sh/v1beta1
kind: K8sRequiredLabels
metadata:
name: require-team-labels
spec:
match:
kinds:
- apiGroups: ["apps"]
kinds: ["Deployment"]
parameters:
labels:
- "app.kubernetes.io/name"
- "app.kubernetes.io/managed-by"
- "team"
# Block containers running as root
apiVersion: templates.gatekeeper.sh/v1
kind: ConstraintTemplate
metadata:
name: k8snoroot
spec:
crd:
spec:
names:
kind: K8sNoRoot
targets:
- target: admission.k8s.gatekeeper.sh
rego: |
package k8snoroot
import rego.v1
violation contains {"msg": msg} if {
container := input.review.object.spec.containers[_]
not container.securityContext.runAsNonRoot
msg := sprintf("Container %s must set runAsNonRoot: true", [container.name])
}
violation contains {"msg": msg} if {
container := input.review.object.spec.containers[_]
container.securityContext.runAsUser == 0
msg := sprintf("Container %s must not run as root (UID 0)", [container.name])
}
---
apiVersion: constraints.gatekeeper.sh/v1beta1
kind: K8sNoRoot
metadata:
name: no-root-containers
spec:
match:
kinds:
- apiGroups: [""]
kinds: ["Pod"]
- apiGroups: ["apps"]
kinds: ["Deployment", "StatefulSet"]
API Integration
// src/middleware/opa-authz.ts — OPA-backed API authorization
import type { Request, Response, NextFunction } from "express";
const OPA_URL = process.env.OPA_URL ?? "http://opa:8181";
export async function authorize(req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) {
const input = {
method: req.method,
path: req.path.split("/").filter(Boolean),
user: {
id: req.user?.id,
role: req.user?.role,
teams: req.user?.teams ?? [],
},
body: req.body,
};
const response = await fetch(`${OPA_URL}/v1/data/authz/allow`, {
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify({ input }),
});
const { result } = await response.json();
if (result) {
next();
} else {
res.status(403).json({ error: "Forbidden" });
}
}
// Usage: app.use(authorize);
Terraform Validation
# policy/terraform.rego — Validate Terraform plans before apply
package terraform
import rego.v1
# Deny public S3 buckets
deny contains msg if {
resource := input.resource_changes[_]
resource.type == "aws_s3_bucket"
resource.change.after.acl == "public-read"
msg := sprintf("S3 bucket %s must not be public", [resource.address])
}
# Require encryption on RDS instances
deny contains msg if {
resource := input.resource_changes[_]
resource.type == "aws_db_instance"
not resource.change.after.storage_encrypted
msg := sprintf("RDS instance %s must have encryption enabled", [resource.address])
}
# Limit instance sizes
deny contains msg if {
resource := input.resource_changes[_]
resource.type == "aws_instance"
not resource.change.after.instance_type in allowed_instance_types
msg := sprintf("Instance %s uses %s, allowed: %v",
[resource.address, resource.change.after.instance_type, allowed_instance_types])
}
allowed_instance_types := {"t3.micro", "t3.small", "t3.medium", "m5.large"}
# Validate Terraform plan with OPA
terraform plan -out=plan.tfplan
terraform show -json plan.tfplan > plan.json
opa eval -d policy/ -i plan.json "data.terraform.deny"
Installation
# CLI
brew install opa
# Docker
docker run -p 8181:8181 openpolicyagent/opa run --server
# Kubernetes (Gatekeeper)
kubectl apply -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/open-policy-agent/gatekeeper/v3.15.0/deploy/gatekeeper.yaml
Examples
Example 1: Setting up Opa for a microservices project
User request:
I have a Node.js API and a React frontend running in Docker. Set up Opa for monitoring/deployment.
The agent creates the necessary configuration files based on patterns like # Gatekeeper ConstraintTemplate — define reusable policy tem, sets up the integration with the existing Docker setup, configures appropriate defaults for a Node.js + React stack, and provides verification commands to confirm everything is working.
Example 2: Troubleshooting kubernetes admission control issues
User request:
Opa is showing errors in our kubernetes admission control. Here are the logs: [error output]
The agent analyzes the error output, identifies the root cause by cross-referencing with common Opa issues, applies the fix (updating configuration, adjusting resource limits, or correcting syntax), and verifies the resolution with appropriate health checks.
Guidelines
- Policy as code — Store policies in Git alongside application code; review policy changes in PRs
- Rego testing — Write unit tests for policies:
opa test policy/ -v; catch policy bugs before deployment - Gatekeeper for K8s — Use OPA Gatekeeper for admission control; enforce policies at deploy time, not just at runtime
- Centralize authorization — Move authorization logic from application code to OPA; one policy engine across all services
- Deny by default — Start with
default allow := false; explicitly grant access rather than revoking - Bundle for distribution — Package policies as OPA bundles; deploy to OPA instances via bundle server
- Terraform validation — Validate
terraform planoutput with OPA beforeterraform apply; prevent misconfigurations - Audit logging — Log OPA decisions for compliance; track who accessed what and which policy allowed/denied it
Information
- Version
- 1.0.0
- Author
- terminal-skills
- Category
- DevOps
- License
- Apache-2.0