Overview
Security is layered: identity, network, data, supply chain, runtime, and ops. The Google Cloud Well-Architected Framework's Security pillar gives you the principles and the product map. This skill applies it to evaluate workloads and recommend concrete controls — not generic advice.
Instructions
Core Principles
| Principle | What it means |
|---|---|
| Security by design | Threat-model in the design phase, not after launch |
| Zero trust | Authenticate every request; trust nothing by network position |
| Shift-left security | Scan, sign, and verify in CI; not in production |
| Preemptive cyber defense | Threat intelligence, centralized logs, automated response |
| Use AI securely & responsibly | Protect models, data, and use SAIF guidance |
| Use AI for security | Gemini in Security, Google SecOps for automation |
| Compliance & privacy | Assured Workloads, Org Policy, regional residency |
Identity & Access (Zero Trust Foundation)
# Disable default networks at org level (Org Policy)
gcloud resource-manager org-policies enable-enforce \
compute.skipDefaultNetworkCreation \
--organization=ORG_ID
# Restrict service account key creation
gcloud resource-manager org-policies enable-enforce \
iam.disableServiceAccountKeyCreation --organization=ORG_ID
# Restrict resources to approved regions
gcloud resource-manager org-policies set-policy policy.yaml --organization=ORG_ID
# policy.yaml — only allow EU regions
constraint: constraints/gcp.resourceLocations
listPolicy:
allowedValues:
- in:eu-locations
# Identity-Aware Proxy for internal apps (no VPN needed)
gcloud iap web add-iam-policy-binding \
--resource-type=backend-services --service=internal-app \
--member="group:eng-team@example.com" \
--role="roles/iap.httpsResourceAccessor"
Network Security
# Hierarchical firewall policies — applied at folder/org, can't be overridden by projects
gcloud compute firewall-policies create global-deny-all \
--organization=ORG_ID --short-name="org-baseline"
gcloud compute firewall-policies rules create 1000 \
--firewall-policy=global-deny-all \
--action=DENY --direction=EGRESS \
--layer4-configs=tcp,udp \
--dest-ip-ranges=0.0.0.0/0
# Cloud Armor — DDoS + WAF for HTTPS load balancers
gcloud compute security-policies create web-policy \
--description="OWASP rules + rate limiting"
gcloud compute security-policies rules create 1000 \
--security-policy=web-policy \
--expression="evaluatePreconfiguredExpr('sqli-v33-stable')" \
--action=deny-403
gcloud compute security-policies rules create 2000 \
--security-policy=web-policy \
--expression="true" \
--action=rate-based-ban \
--rate-limit-threshold-count=100 \
--rate-limit-threshold-interval-sec=60 \
--ban-duration-sec=600 \
--conform-action=allow \
--enforce-on-key=IP
# VPC Service Controls — perimeter around sensitive APIs (BigQuery, GCS, etc.)
gcloud access-context-manager perimeters create prod-perimeter \
--title="Prod data perimeter" \
--resources=projects/PROJECT_NUMBER \
--restricted-services=bigquery.googleapis.com,storage.googleapis.com \
--policy=POLICY_NUMBER
VPC Service Controls is the right answer when you need data-exfiltration protection — it prevents service accounts inside the perimeter from sending data to projects outside it, even with valid credentials.
Shift-Left: Supply Chain Security
# cloudbuild.yaml — scan, sign, then deploy
steps:
- name: gcr.io/cloud-builders/docker
args: ['build', '-t', '${_IMAGE}:${SHORT_SHA}', '.']
- name: gcr.io/google.com/cloudsdktool/cloud-sdk
entrypoint: gcloud
args: ['artifacts', 'docker', 'images', 'scan', '${_IMAGE}:${SHORT_SHA}',
'--remote', '--format=value(response.scan)']
- name: gcr.io/google.com/cloudsdktool/cloud-sdk
entrypoint: bash
args:
- -c
- |
VULNS=$(gcloud artifacts docker images list-vulnerabilities \
${_IMAGE}:${SHORT_SHA} --filter="severity=CRITICAL" --format="value(name)")
if [ -n "$VULNS" ]; then
echo "Critical vulnerabilities found"; exit 1
fi
- name: gcr.io/google.com/cloudsdktool/cloud-sdk
entrypoint: gcloud
args: ['artifacts', 'docker', 'images', 'sign', '${_IMAGE}:${SHORT_SHA}',
'--key=projects/PROJECT/locations/global/keyRings/binauthz/cryptoKeys/build-signer/cryptoKeyVersions/1']
images: ['${_IMAGE}:${SHORT_SHA}']
# Binary Authorization policy — only signed, scanned images deploy
defaultAdmissionRule:
evaluationMode: REQUIRE_ATTESTATION
enforcementMode: ENFORCED_BLOCK_AND_AUDIT_LOG
requireAttestationsBy:
- projects/PROJECT/attestors/build-attestor
- projects/PROJECT/attestors/security-attestor
clusterAdmissionRules:
us-central1.prod-cluster:
evaluationMode: REQUIRE_ATTESTATION
enforcementMode: ENFORCED_BLOCK_AND_AUDIT_LOG
requireAttestationsBy:
- projects/PROJECT/attestors/build-attestor
- projects/PROJECT/attestors/security-attestor
Data Protection
# Customer-managed encryption keys (CMEK) — you own the key, Google holds the cipher
gcloud kms keyrings create prod --location=us-central1
gcloud kms keys create db-key --keyring=prod --location=us-central1 --purpose=encryption
# Use CMEK on a Cloud SQL instance
gcloud sql instances create orders \
--database-version=POSTGRES_15 \
--tier=db-custom-2-7680 --region=us-central1 \
--disk-encryption-key=projects/my-project/locations/us-central1/keyRings/prod/cryptoKeys/db-key
# Sensitive Data Protection — find and redact PII in BigQuery
gcloud dlp jobs create \
--inspect-job-from-file=inspect-pii.json
{
"inspectJob": {
"storageConfig": {
"bigQueryOptions": {
"tableReference": {
"projectId": "my-project",
"datasetId": "raw",
"tableId": "events"
}
}
},
"inspectConfig": {
"infoTypes": [
{"name": "EMAIL_ADDRESS"}, {"name": "CREDIT_CARD_NUMBER"},
{"name": "US_SOCIAL_SECURITY_NUMBER"}, {"name": "PHONE_NUMBER"}
],
"minLikelihood": "LIKELY"
},
"actions": [
{ "saveFindings": { "outputConfig": { "table": {
"projectId": "my-project", "datasetId": "dlp", "tableId": "findings"
}}}}
]
}
}
Security Command Center & SecOps
# Enable Security Command Center Premium / Enterprise (org-level)
gcloud scc settings update --organization=ORG_ID --service=security-command-center
# Subscribe a Pub/Sub topic to high-severity findings for automated response
gcloud scc notifications create high-severity-findings \
--organization=ORG_ID \
--description="Critical and high findings" \
--pubsub-topic=projects/my-project/topics/scc-findings \
--filter='severity="HIGH" OR severity="CRITICAL"'
Wire the Pub/Sub topic to a Cloud Function that auto-remediates well-known issues (e.g., disable a public bucket, revoke an over-broad IAM grant) and pages on-call for the rest.
Validation Checklist
Security by design
- Defense-in-depth at network, host, and application layers
- Threat model exists and is reviewed for major changes
- Risk assessment uses an industry framework (NIST CSF, CIS)
Zero trust
- Default networks disabled at org level
- All apps front-ended by IAP or equivalent (no public admin endpoints)
- VPC Service Controls perimeters around sensitive data services
- Service-to-service auth via OIDC tokens; no shared secrets
Shift-left
- All infra in IaC (Terraform); no console clicks for prod
- CI/CD includes vulnerability scan + signing
- Binary Authorization enforces signed-only deployment
- Dependency updates automated (Renovate / Dependabot)
Preemptive defense
- Security Command Center Premium/Enterprise enabled at org
- All audit logs centralized to a SIEM or BigQuery
- Automated response for known patterns (public buckets, over-broad IAM)
- Red-team / pen-test exercises run regularly
AI security
- AI training pipelines protected against data poisoning
- Differential privacy / data masking on training data where applicable
- Vertex Explainable AI used for governance
Examples
Example 1 — Hardening review for a Cloud Run service
User has a customer-facing API on Cloud Run. Walk through: front it with a global HTTPS LB + Cloud Armor (OWASP rules + rate limit), require IAP for the admin endpoints, attach a least-privilege service account (no broad Editor), encrypt the Cloud SQL backend with CMEK, route audit logs to BigQuery, and enroll the project under a VPC Service Controls perimeter that blocks egress of customer data to external projects.
Example 2 — Build a deploy-time policy that blocks unscanned images
User wants to enforce that only scanned-and-signed images deploy to GKE prod. Set up Artifact Analysis vulnerability scanning on the registry, add Cloud Build steps that scan + fail on critical, sign with a KMS key on success, and configure Binary Authorization with REQUIRE_ATTESTATION on the prod cluster. Test by attempting to deploy an unsigned image — should be blocked with an audit log entry.
Guidelines
- Default networks off at org level — they're a liability, not a feature
- Disable service account key creation — use Workload Identity / impersonation
- Restrict regions via Org Policy if you have data-residency obligations
- IAP everywhere for internal apps; never expose admin UIs to the public internet
- VPC Service Controls when you genuinely have data-exfil concerns; expect a learning curve
- Cloud Armor on every public-facing load balancer — preconfigured WAF rules cost nothing extra
- Binary Authorization is the only way to actually enforce "signed images only" at runtime
- CMEK when keys must be in your control; default Google-managed encryption is otherwise fine
- Sensitive Data Protection for PII discovery in BigQuery / GCS — automate, don't audit manually
- Security Command Center Premium/Enterprise is non-negotiable at scale; the free tier is too limited
- For AI workloads, follow Google's SAIF (Secure AI Framework) — it's the only published practical guidance